If you’ve been a reader of this blog, I’ve discussed the justification for a traffic stop based upon the observations of an informant. A recent Third Appellant District Court case further defines the information necessary to justify the stop.

In this case, State v. Fields, 2009 Ohio 5909, an informant called police dispatch to inform them of a suspected drunk driver. The defendant filed a motion to suppress claiming the police officer had insufficient cause to stop the Defendant. At the motion hearing, the state called the informant who testified as follows:

Q Did you have an opportunity to make a 911 call on November 28th, 2008, around 6 o’clock in the event?

A Yes.

Q And where were you at when you made that call?

A I was heading south on South Sandusky.

Q And is that in the City of Upper Sandusky?

A Yes. Hm-hmm.

Q Wyandot County, Ohio?

A Yeah.

Q Could you describe what you observed?

At no time did the informant testify as to his personal observations of the defendant at the time of the incident. In addition, the officer’s testimony failed to illustrate that he or the dispatcher were aware of the details of the informant’s personal observations.

In its analysis, the court cited State v. Bailey, 2008 Ohio 2254. In that case the arresting officer testified that he had received a dispatch that another police department had received a call of a “possible drunk driver” and that one of the officers at the other department had witnessed the same vehicle speeding. The arresting officer located the vehicle and pulled it over after observing the vehicle’s failure to signal. Neither the other police officer who had observed the vehicle’s speeding nor the dispatcher who had received the citizen’s phone call testified at the hearing. In addition, the citizen informant who had made the original call to the other police department testified extensively to his personal observations of the defendant’s erratic driving. However, there was no testimony demonstrating what, if any, information the eyewitness had relayed to the other police department’s dispatcher concerning the defendant’s erratic behavior. Since the State had failed to demonstrate that the law-enforcement community as a whole possessed facts constituting probable cause to arrest.

In its conclusion, the court stated, “there is an absence of evidence demonstrating that someone in the law enforcement community knew specific facts that would support reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. The State failed to demonstrate that [the informant’s] personal observations were relayed to the dispatcher, thereby allowing [the arresting officer] to solely rely on the dispatch to justify his investigative stop of [the informant]. Furthermore, [the officer’s] testimony, considered alone, fails to demonstrate reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. While we acknowledge that there is evidence that a law enforcement officer…eventually talked to [the informant] at the scene, this did not occur until after [the arresting officer] had already approached Fields to make the detention and investigation.

Therefore, this court held that the state must place the following on the record in support of a stop based upon the observations of an informant:

1. The observations of the informant, and

2. That these observations were communicated to the arresting officer, and

3. The observations will support reasonable, articuable suspicion of criminal activity..

For evidentiary purposes, the court will not allow the trier of fact to draw an inference based solely on conclusary statements of a dispatcher. To do otherwise would permit the trier of fact to draw and inference on an inference which would violate the Rules of Evidence.

In passed blogs I’ve discussed the term “probable cause” as it relates to an initial stop and ultimate arrest. In both instances these discussions involved information gathered solely by observations of the arresting officers. But, what if the officer does not personally observe the driver? Can a stop be initiated based upon information provided by an informant?

The simple answer is yes. A recent Stark County Court of Appeals opinion contains an excellent discussion of the topic. In the case, State v. Yoder, a citizen observed the defendant urinating in the parking lot of a restaurant and then stagger to the driver’s side of the defendant’s vehicle. The informant called 1-800-GRABDUI, providing his name, contact information, and the current location of driver. The informant gave the dispatcher a description of and the license plate number of the defendant’s vehicle. The caller further stated he observed the defendant having trouble walking to his vehicle and staggering badly, prior to driving the vehicle. The informant followed the defendant’s vehicle to the parking lot of a car wash, and waited for the police to respond. The officers waited for the defendant to exit the car wash and stopped the vehicle as it exited the car wash.

The officer approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and asked for the defendant’s driver’s license. At the time, the officer smelled a strong odor of alcohol and noted the defendant was “thick tongued.” The defendant was asked to exit the vehicle and to perform standard field sobriety tests and was subsequently charged with OVI. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress claiming the officer illegally stopped him having not personally observed indicia of the violations for which he was charged.

In its opinion, the court stated, “An investigative stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution if the police have reasonable suspicion the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity…Reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause…But it requires something more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’…The Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.”

“Where the information possessed by the police before the stop was solely from an informant’s tip, the determination of reasonable suspicion will be limited to an examination of the weight to be given the tip and the reliability of the tip. Courts have generally identified three classes of informants: the anonymous informant, the known informant from the criminal world who has provided previous reliable tips, and the identified citizen informant. An identified citizen informant may be highly reliable, and therefore a strong showing as to other indicia of reliability may be unnecessary.

The defendant argued that the officer had no personal knowledge which would lead him to believe that the defendant was violating the law; that the officers failed to personally observe any evidence of a traffic violation that would justify the stop.

The court quoted Adams v. Williams, a US Supreme Court Case in stating, “A tip which standing alone would lack sufficient indicia of reliability may establish reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop if it is sufficiently corroborated through independent police work.”

In applying this jurisprudence the court found that the informant’s information was “trustworthy and due significant weight.” Reciting the facts, the court stated the informant had identified himself, making him a known informant subjecting his observations to high reliability that the officers could rely upon.

As such, the appellate court upheld the lower court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress.

Therefore, the answer to the questions is yes. A driver may be the subject of an investigatory stop based upon information provided by an information supplied by an informant provided that information is reliable.