A recent Ohio Supreme Court case demonstrates the futility felt by many Defendants and their attorneys even when the higher court sustains the Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence that is fundamental to the prosecution of one accused of OVI in Ohio.

The case, O’Neill v. Mayberry, 2010 Ohio 1707, involved a defendant charged with (1) aggravated vehicular assault in violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a), a third degree felony; (2) failure to stop after an accident in violation of R.C. 4549.02(A) and (B), a third degree felony; (3) aggravated vehicular homicide in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(1)(a), a second degree felony; (4) operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), a first degree misdemeanor; and (5) operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(f), a first degree misdemeanor. A conviction of the more serious charges had to be predicated on a successful prosecution of one of the charges under R.C. 4511.19.

The trial court denied O’Neill’s motion to suppress the results of his blood alcohol tests performed after his arrest. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, O’Neill entered pleas of no contest to Counts 1, 2, 3, and 5, Count 5 being the OVI charge. In exchange, the state dismissed Count 4, the per se violation, and O’Neill was sentenced on his no contest pleas. The Defendant appealed his convictions and the Supreme Court sustained his motion to suppress. resulting in the dismissal of the per se violation. It is important to note that the court in its opinion stated that “…O’Neill’s convictions for aggravated vehicular homicide and aggravated vehicular assault depended upon a violation of R.C. 4511.19.”

Nonetheless, the state re-instituted prosecution of O’Neill on the original charges. O’Neill attempted to have these charges dismissed by filing a Writ of Prohibition with the Supreme Court claiming the lower court no longer had jurisdiction to try the charges.

The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed saying, “[i]n the absence of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal,” State ex rel. Shimko v. McMonagle (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 426, 428-429…Upon remand from an appellate court, the lower court is required to proceed from the point at which the error occurred…Accordingly, when we remanded the case to the trial court following our determination that the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress, respondent was required to proceed from the point at which the error occurred, that is, after he denied the motion to suppress but before the plea agreement in which the state dismissed the general DUI charge.”

So, while the per se violation was dismissed, the state was permitted to go forward on the OVI charge, thus predicating a conviction of the more serious offenses based upon a conviction of that OVI case.

Recently, I received my new telephone books and glued to the front of the book was an advertisement from a local attorney with his “Advise When Stopped for a DUI.” One of his prominent pieces of advise was “Never….Never Agree to take a Breathalyzer Test.” Is this blanket advise sound? In some instances yes. In most instances no. Like most advise, the surrounding circumstances play a major role in the decision. This blog discusses the consequences of one’s refusal.

First, one’s refusal to agree to take a test is a violation of Ohio’s “implied consent” statute. That statute, O.R.C. 4511.191, sets forth the law that the right to drive in Ohio implies the driver’s agreement to submit to a chemical test when requested. They may refuse, but that refusal will result in a one year suspension of their driving privileges in Ohio.

In addition to one’s violation of the implied consent statute, that refusal will trigger the new twenty year “look back” rule. Ordinarily, the enhancement provisions of Ohio’s OVI laws depend upon the number of OVI convictions within the prior six years. As a result of a refusal, the enhancement provision are triggered for any prior OVI violations in the last TWENTY years.

Finally, a recent Ohio Supreme Court decisions permitted courts to increase a violator’s penalties for refusing a chemical test. Historically, Ohio courts held to the rule that while a person’s refusal to take a test violated Ohio’s implied consent law, that person did have a constitutional right to refuse. As such, courts rarely increased a person’s penalties for their refusal to take a test. The Ohio Supreme court’s ruling changed that. The court ruled that the right to drive in Ohio is a privilege and not an inherent constitutional right. Therefore, a court is permitted to increase penalties for refusing without violating the person’s constitutional rights.

Allow me to provide you an example of the hornet’s nest that can result from one’s refusal to take a test. This was true case. My client was driving home from his girlfriend’s house where they were watching a football game. While watching the game, they had a pizza and a “couple of beers.” At one time my client was a heavy drinker and had several violations for OVI earlier in his life. But he had reformed and had no violations for OVI in the last six years. On the way home, he crossed the center line and was stopped by the local police. When asked to take a test, he refused.

Let’s assume he had taken the breathalyzer and been convicted. As a first time offender in six years, he would have faced a first degree misdemeanor carrying the following possible sentence:

Three days in jail or a three day driver’s intervention program, a $375-$1075 fine, a license suspension for six months to one year, and the right to request limited driving privileges for work, medical, etc after fifteen days.

So what were the consequences of his refusal?

First, he received a suspension of his driving privileges for one year. But, that wasn’t the worst of it. His refusal triggered the twenty year look back rule. While he had no violations in the last six years. He had five others in the prior twenty years. Therefore, under Ohio law, he faced a forth degree felony OVI conviction as it was his sixth violation in twenty years. He faced the following penalties: Actual incarceration for a minimum of 120 days (four months) up to 1 year, a $1350-$10,500 fine, a mandatory alcohol addiction program, license suspension for three years to life with no privileges for three years, an alcohol interlock on any car he drove, and a forfeiture of his car to the State of Ohio (he had just purchased, for cash, a new Jeep Cherokee).

So should he have agreed to take the breathalyzer? Of course. Even if convicted, the consequences were minimal compared to what he faced as a result of his refusal.

Knowing the accused’s background is critical in properly advising them. Offering blanket advise against submitting to a test can have dire consequences.

Historically, courts have normally sentenced defendants to the minimum sentence upon conviction or plea to an OVI, i.e. three days for a first time offender, ten days to a second offense, and so on, depending upon the number of prior convictions within a six year period. With the enactment of the “look-back rule” and the recent Hoover decision, more and more defendants are looking at sentences exceeding the minimum.

A recent case from Clermont County is typical of this trend. The case, State v. Elliott, 2009 Ohio 5926, involved a multiple offender. Since the defendant had refused the breathalyzer, the look back rule was imposed and it was found that this offender had been convicted more that 5 times for OVI. In fact, he had 15 convictions in his lifetime. The court sentenced the defendant to the maximum 30 months in jail. Additionally, because the defendant was on community control sanctions at the time of his arrest, the judge sentenced the defendant to an additional 12 months in jail to run consecutively with his sentence on the OVI. In total, the defendant was given 42 months in jail (3½ years).

The defendant appealed his sentence claiming the court abused it discretion in imposing such a draconian sentence. He appealed on two grounds. First, he claimed the sentence imposed was not supported by the record and is contrary to law. Second, he claimed the sentence imposed was excessive and failed to achieve the overriding purposes of felony sentencing.

The court disposed of the first issue by stating “Trial courts have full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range and are no longer required to make findings or give their reasons for imposing maximum, consecutive, or more than the minimum sentences,” State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006 Ohio 856, P100, 845 N.E.2d 470. In applying Foster appellate courts must apply a two-step approach. First, they must examine the sentencing court’s compliance with all applicable rules and statutes in imposing the sentence to determine whether the sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law. If this first prong is satisfied, the trial court’s decision shall be reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard,” State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008 Ohio 4912, P4, 896 N.E.2d 124.

The court went on to say, “A sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law, where the trial court consider[s] the purposes [of the sentencing guidelines], …properly applie[s] post-release control, and … sentence[s] [appellant]…within the permissible range.” In addition, so long as the trial court gives “careful and substantial deliberation to the relevant statutory considerations” the court’s sentencing decision is not an abuse of discretion.

The appellate court found that the judge, on the record. had reviewed the sentencing guidelines, balanced the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth in the guidelines, and as, required, informed the appellant he could be subjected to three years of post release controls.

The court addressed the appellant second claim by reviewing the appellant’s record. The record clearly showed that the appellant had 15 prior convictions for OVI, the he was ordered into treatment that failed, and that the defendant’s license had been suspended several times but he continued to drive.

Therefore, the court concluded that the judge did comply with the law by applying the sentencing guidelines set forth in the Ohio Revised Code. Further, addressing the second prong of the sentencing review, found that the lower court did not violate the abuse-of-discretion standard.

As a result, in applying this court’s opinion, a court’s sentence will not be overturned if the record on appeal shows:

1. That the court balanced the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth in the statute.

2. Told the defendant of the possibility of post relief control (if applicable), and

3. The record of the defendant justified the sentence being imposed (abuse- of-discretion standard).

Courts are beginning to adopt the findings in State v. Hoover, 2009 Ohio 4993, permitting lower courts to enhance a person’s sentence for refusing to submit to a chemical test in OVI prosecutions.

Historically, it was thought that a defendant had a constitutional right to refuse to submit to a chemical test. While the refusal could result in an administrative suspension under Ohio’s Implied consent Law, O.R.C. 4511.191, it was thought that it was a violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to enhance a sentence due to the defendant refusal.

The Third District Appellate Court (Union County, Ohio) had reiterated this long established thinking in rejecting a lower court’s enhancement of a defendant’s sentence due to the defendant’s refusal to submit to a test. But the Ohio Supreme Court rejected this long held interpretation and overruled the appellate court’s opinion. In its opinion the supreme court stated:

“It is crucial to note that the refusal to consent to testing is not, itself, a criminal offense. The activity prohibited under R.C. 4511.19(A)(2) is operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol. A person’s refusal to take a chemical test is simply an additional element that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt along with the person’s previous DUI conviction to distinguish the offense from a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a).”

“Hoover contends, however, that he has a constitutional right to revoke his implied consent and that being forced by threat of punishment to submit to a chemical test violates his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution, which provide that persons, houses, and effects are protected against unreasonable search and seizure. However, Hoover has no constitutional right to refuse to take a reasonably reliable chemical test for intoxication…Asking a driver to comply with conduct he has no right to refuse and thereafter enhancing a later sentence upon conviction does not violate the constitution.”

In rejecting an appeal from the Coshocton Municipal Court, The Fifth Appellate District adopted the findings in State v. Hoover. It appears that court, prosecutors and police have an additional hammer to hold over the head of a detainee to demand that they submit to a chemical test.

It would be wise that any advocate advising those arrested for OVI rethink their unwavering advise to refuse a test. There may be valid reasons to do so, BUT the possibility of additional sanctions should be part of the decision making process.

Legal experts have debated for years the issue of restricted freedoms due to actions that might not be criminal by definition. The major debate centers around sentence enhancement due to one’s refusal to submit to chemical testing, i.e. blood draws, DNA tests, etc. Even the US Supreme Court has raised the ire of many legal scholars because of its differing opinions relating to many of these freedoms.

If you read this blog, a recent article discussed one appellate court’s opinion regarding the criminalization of a defendant’s right to refuse to submit to a chemical test. While most legal scholars side on a defendant’s right to refuse without the stigma of an enhanced sentence, the Fifth Appellate Court in State of Ohio v. Adam, sustained the lower court’s right to enhance the defendant’s sentence for his refusal to submit to a chemical test.

Apparently, the Ohio Supreme Court, in its recent decision in State v. Hoover, 2009 Ohio 4993, has put the issue to rest (at least in Ohio) for multiple offenders. In that case, the defendant refused the breathalyzer and his sentence was doubled due to his violation of O.R.C. 4511.19(A)(2). That statute permits the enhancement of an OVI sentence if the defendant refused to submit to a chemical test and has a prior conviction in the last 20 years.

The defendant argued that the statute violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights which protects him from illegal searches and seizures and violations of his due process rights. The court disagreed stating that the right to drive in Ohio is not an inherent constitutional right. It is a privilege that does not have the same constitutional safeguards.

The court cited the cases of Westerville v.Cunningham, 15 Ohio St. 2d 121 and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 that stated section 4511.191 of the Ohio Revised Code, does not violate the search and seizure provision of the Fourth Amendment, nor the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The court also cited State v. Gustafson, 76 Ohio St.3d 425 which declared that the administrative license suspension provisions of the 4511.19 was not a violation of the defendant’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights to further rationalize its findings.

In conclusion, the court declared the enhancement provision for refusing to submit to a chemical test is constitutional and allows a court to enhance a defendant’s sentence if the following are proven beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) a DUI conviction within 20 years of the current violation, (2) operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and (3) a refusal to submit to a chemical test while under arrest for the current DUI.

You will note the court did not address the issue of court’s right to enhance the sentence of a first time offender for their refusal to submit to a chemical test. This is still under debate as discussed in a prior blog.