Most practitioners might assume once an individual is placed in a police car, they are in custody and subject to Miranda warnings before any statement made be the person is admissible. A recent Hamilton County case might force an attorney to rethink this assumption.

Miranda warnings must be provided when a defendant is subject to a “custodial interrogation.” A custodial interrogation is “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way,” Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 467-468, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694.

Generally, “motorists temporarily detained pursuant to ordinary traffic stops are not in custody for purposes of Miranda,” State v. Leonard, 1st Dist. No. C-060595, 2007 Ohio 3312, P 19, citing Berkemer v. McCarty (1984), 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317. But “if a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him ‘in custody’ for practical purposes, he is entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda,” Berkemer v. McCarty (1984), 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317.

The case that redefines this assumption is State v. Rice, 2009 Ohio 6332. In that case, the defendant was placed, uncuffed, in a police car and admitted have four 16 oz. beers prior to being stopped. He was not Mirandized prior to this statement. The defendant sought to suppress this statement along with field sobriety tests given prior to the Miranda warnings.

The courts reasoning was as follows:

“In this case, Rice was not in custody. Trooper Shimko had valid reasons for removing Rice from his vehicle and placing him in the cruiser. Two other passengers were in the vehicle that was stopped, and Shimko needed to determine whether the odor of alcohol had come from Rice. The interests of safety further justified placing Rice in the cruiser, since Rice had been stopped near high-speed traffic on the side of an interstate highway. Although Rice had been placed in the back seat of the cruiser, this did not transform a routine stop into a custodial interrogation. Trooper Shimko did not subject Rice to a lengthy interrogation, and Rice was not handcuffed while he was in the cruiser. Further, the interaction between Rice and Shimko was neither combative nor intimidating. Because Rice had not been subject to a custodial interrogation, Miranda warnings were not required, and his statements made in the cruiser should not have been suppressed.”

The obvious conclusion that must be drawn from this case (at least for those practicing DUI defense in Hamilton County) is that even though an individual is placed in a police car does not necessarily infer that they are in custody. Apparently, the fact that the individual was placed in a police car where the back doors automatically lock, and his movements restricted, had little influence on the court’s decision.

Many of my readers (in spite of my pleas to the contrary) enter court and attempt to resolve their OVI cases without benefit of counsel. The usual scenario consists of the first time offender pleading to one of the OVI charges, paying a fine, suffering a lengthy license suspension, and attending a 3-day diversion program.

But, because any OVI has a possible jail sentence of 6-months or more, the law mandates that any defendant be given their rights prior to the court accepting a plea. Criminal Rule 11(E) provides that “the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no contest, and shall not accept such pleas without first informing the defendant of the effect of the plea of guilty, no contest, and not guilty.”

The provisions of Crim. R. 44(B) and (C) regarding counsel apply to division (E) of this rule. Crim. R. 44(B) governs the appointment of counsel in petty offenses: “Where a defendant charged with a petty offense is unable to obtain counsel, the court may assign counsel to represent him. When a defendant charged with a petty offense is unable to obtain counsel, no sentence of confinement may be imposed upon him, unless after being fully advised by the court, he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives assignment of counsel.” The rule goes on to say that the waiver must also be in writing and filed with the court.

A knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of counsel is demonstrated through inquiry by the trial court that is sufficient “to determine whether defendant fully understands and intelligently relinquishes” representation. State v. Gibson, 45 Ohio St.2d 366, 345 N.E.2d 399.

Therefore, any defendant charged with an offense wherein a 6-month sentence, or more, can be imposed must be apprised of his constitutional rights, if not represented by counsel, including their right to an attorney, their right to confront witnesses against them, their right to subpoena witnesses on their behalf, the right to be tried by a jury or by the court, and their right to remain silent and requiring the state to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

These rights must be outlined in open court on the record. His waiver of these rights must also be in writing and kept on file with the court. In fact, if the court fails to comply with the edicts of Criminal Rule 11(E) and 44(B) and (C), no plea to a subsequent OVI can be enhanced.

So, if you insist on representing yourself in court, be sure you are made aware of your constitutional rights, understand them, have them given to you in open court, in writing, and filed with the court.

An unusual but important precedent was just announced by the Sixth Appellate District, Lucas County, Ohio regarding the use of employer mandated chemical tests in OVI prosecutions. The case, Ohio v. Groszewski, 2009 Ohio 4062, appears to champion a defendant’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.

The case involved a City of Toledo employee who was ordered by his supervisor to submit to a breathalyzer test per his employment contract. The contract required all employees to submit to a chemical test when asked. The employee went to the hospital to have the test performed. The results of the test indicated a blood alcohol level of 0.093, just above the legal limit (.08).

At the time a Toledo Police Officer was also at the hospital on unrelated business when he saw the Toledo City Director of Public Service speaking on his cell phone with a Toledo Police captain. The officer then got on the cell phone and was informed that the Defendant may have been driving a city vehicle under the influence. The officer reentered the hospital, interviewed the defendant’s supervisor who said he saw the defendant drive a city vehicle. The results of the breathalyzer were then revealed to the officer. He interviewed the defendant who made incriminating statements and asked the defendant to perform field sobriety tests. The defendant was then arrested for OVI and asked to submit to a blood test.

Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress asking that all tests and statements be suppressed. These were denied by the lower court and the defendant appealed.

The appellate court stated, “The Fifth amendment protects persons against compelled self-incrimination, and any testimony given under compulsion invokes that constitutional right, Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 US 52. If the state forces a public employee to choose between either answering incriminating questions or forfeiting his job for refusing to answer, the state cannot use the employee’s statements against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution if the employee chooses to answer because the statements were not given voluntarily, Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493. Thus, all statements made by the public employee under these conditions become immunized testimony.”

Regarding the admissibility of the breathalyzer and blood tests, the court opined that …”a breath test or a blood test to determine alcohol content for the purpose of proving a criminal offense, is a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757. The Ohio Supreme Court has previously held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits placing a defendant in a position of choosing between allowing a warrantless search or facing criminal penalties, Wilson v. Cincinnati, 46 Ohio St.2d 138.”

The court went on, “In this case, appellant was compelled to submit to the breathalyzer tests and blood tests, or risk forfeiting his employment. In addition, his employment contract limited his consent to the test and release of the results only to the city of Toledo. Nothing in the agreement refers to the possibility of criminal prosecution or release of information to any law enforcement agency. Appellant was not involved in an accident and was not observed by police to be driving in such a way that would indicate that he was under the influence of alcohol. Since appellant did not submit to the test pursuant to a police investigation or court order, both tests would have been warrantless searches in relationship to any potential criminal action.”

“Likewise, any sobriety tests performed were not incident to any initial police investigation. Rather, they were performed only after appellant agreed to present himself for the employer’s requested testing. Therefore, no probable cause initially existed for police even to be present at the hospital for any type of investigation. Appellant submitted to testing solely at the request of his employer, at the advice of his union representative, with only the potential penalty of losing his job as a consequence.”

It is important to note that the court did express it condemnation of the defendant’s actions, but “neither [could they] condone the “ambush” tactics that were employed to create a criminal offense from an employee’s compliance with his employer’s drug/alcohol testing requirement.”

As a result, the court overruled the findings of the lower court and suppressed both the tests and statements of the defendant.

Therefore, under these limited set of facts an employee can be assured that tests taken in compliance with their employment agreement can not be used in a subsequent criminal proceeding. But, it is important to note the narrow parameters of these facts. First, the employment agreement had no covenant permitting the city to share the test findings with any other agency. Second, the officer viewed no independant indicia of a traffic violation or other criminal activity that would justify an investigatory stop. Had any of the facts been different from those in this case, the finding might be different.

When a motorist is stopped and the officer is suspicious of alcohol use, the suspect is normally asked to vacate the vehicle and asked to perform tests to determine physical dexterity and metal awareness. These tests are called field sobriety tests. They normally consist of a horizontal gaze nystagmus test, a “walk-and turn” test, and a “one-legged” test. If the officer observes a certain number of “clues” the officer then may determine there is probable cause to arrest the suspect for OVI.

But many of my clients want to know what level of evidence is necessary for the officer to demand these tests. In other words, when they are stopped for some underlying traffic violation, what needs to be observed and how certain must the officer be before they can demand these tests?

Recently, the Fifth District Court of Appeal, Fairfield County, wrote an excellent opinion on the subject. In the case, State v. Strope, the Defendant was stopped for a headlight violation. While addressing the Defendant, the officer smelled a strong odor of alcohol on the Defendant’s person and observed his eyes were red and glassy. The officer asked the Defendant to vacate the vehicle and perform field sobriety tests. After observing sufficient clues, the officer arrested the Defendant for OVI. Prior to trial the Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress, arguing, in part, that the officer “…lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct field sobriety testing.”

In its opinion, the court stated,

“It is well-established that an officer may not request a motorist to perform field sobriety tests unless that request is independently justified by reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts that the motorist is intoxicated… Reasonable suspicion is something more than an inchoate or unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause. A court will analyze the reasonableness of the request based on the totality of the circumstances, viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they unfold.”

The court went on to say:

“Where a non-investigatory stop is initiated and the odor of alcohol is combined with glassy or bloodshot eyes and further indicia of intoxication, such as an admission of having consumed alcohol, reasonable suspicion exists.”

The Defendant went on to argue that based upon the above that the officer had insufficient articuable facts to rise to the level of reasonable suspicion. The Defendant cited the case of State v. Spillers. In that case, the court opined:

“…a de minimus traffic violation, slight odor of alcohol and admission to having consumed a couple drinks was insufficient to justify the performance of field sobriety tests.”

The Fifth Appellate District disagreed with the Defendant’s argument stating that in the cited case only a “slight” smell or alcohol was observed while in the present case a “strong” smell was noted.

Based on the above, it appears an officer can ask you to perform field sobriety tests if:

1. The officer first observes a traffic or equipment violation justifying a stop and

2. The officer observes multiple indicators of alcohol use.