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Archive for the ‘Constitutional Issues – General’ Category

Recently, the Tenth Appellate District Court saw fit to address several issues that are the subject of controversy in Ohio.  Interestingly, the court discussed these issues in spite of the fact that the defendant failed to file appropriate pre-trial motions or raise the issues during trial.

 
The case, State v. Curtis, 2011 Ohio 3298, involved issues of proper blood draw procedures, compliance with the mandates of The Ohio Administrative Code and the controversy surrounding, O.R.C.2945.75(B), the right to introduced certified copies of judgment entries in lieu of live testimony from the convicting court.

 
During its discussion of these issues, the court noted that the defendant failed to bring them to the attention of the lower court by way of pre-trial motions or raise the issues during trial and, as a result, severally restricted the defendant’s arguments relating to those issues and shifted the burden to the defendant rather than the state.

 
In the defendant’s first assignment of error the defendant asked the court to reverse his conviction for OVI as his conviction was based upon unreliable blood evidence.  The facts of the case are compelling as the blood sample was not refrigerated as required, an uncertified laboratory performed the test, the “chain of custody” was questioned, and the blood was drawn more than three hours after the incident.

 
The court began its analysis by stating that the defendant’s failure to objection to the introduction of the test by a pre-trial motion, waived the state’s requirement to lay a foundation for its admissibility.  Having said, that, the court, nonetheless, opined regarding the admissibility of the evidence notwithstanding the defendant’s failure to address the issue in the lower court.

 
The court stated, “…the three-hour time limit set forth in R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(b) and referenced by appellant, we point out that this requirement is set forth in the statutory provision that addresses offenses involving “per se” violations…In  Newark v. Lucas (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 100, the court found where the test results are not dispositive to a determination of guilt or innocence, such as in a situation involving an alleged “impaired” violation, the fact that the blood was withdrawn outside the statutory time frame does not diminish the probative value of the results in a prosecution for an “impaired” violation.”

 
In summary, the court found that the three hour rule only applies to prosecutions founded on a chemical test and does not apply to prosecutions based upon impaired driving only.

 
The defendant went on to argue the test’s admissibility due to the fact that chain of custody requirements were not met.  The court stated, “…when an accused challenges the admissibility of a chemical test based upon a failure to comply with an Ohio Department of Health regulation, the state need only demonstrate substantial compliance…Moreover, once the state has demonstrated substantial compliance, the burden shifts back to the accused to show that he was prejudiced by less than strict compliance. State v. Plummer (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 292, 295.”  After citing evidence presented at trial, the court was satisfied that the state had substantially complied.

 
Finally, the defendant argued his procedural and substantive due process rights were abridged when the court permitted certified copies of his prior convictions to be admitted without requiring oral testimony by representatives of the lower courts.  Again, the court reiterated that the defendant failed to address this constitutional issue at trail, but nonetheless addressed this issue.  The defendant argued that O.R.C. 2945.75(B)(2), which permits the introduction of certified court records in lieu of actual testimony, is unconstitutional as it “shifts the burden of proof and relieves the prosecution of its burden of proving all of the elements of appellant’s prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt.”

 
The court said, “In conducting a substantive due process analysis, we must determine whether appellant has invoked a “fundamental” liberty interest, which would then trigger “strict scrutiny” review….under strict scrutiny review, a law will be invalidated unless the state demonstrates that the law is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. In the instant case, appellant has failed to identify the “fundamental” interest he asserts has been violated by R.C. 2945.75(B)(2). Thus, we analyze this under a “rational basis” review.”

 
“Under rational basis review, the statute will be upheld if it is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest. Id. at ¶25, citing Am. Assoc. of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter v. Cent. State Univ., 87 Ohio St.3d 55, 1999 Ohio 248.”  The court went on, “Appellant has not presented an argument as to how this subsection of the statute would fail under a rational basis review and we fail to see how R.C. 2945.75(B)(2) implicates appellant’s constitutional rights. Like R.C. 2945.75(B)(1), which appellant has not challenged, R.C. 2945.75(B)(2) permits the State to make a prima facie showing as to appellant’s prior convictions. However, it does not relieve the State of its burden of proof nor shift the burden of proof to the accused….it allows the accused the opportunity to rebut the record…”

 

The court denied the defendant’s argument.

 
So, what do we learn from such a case?  First, is the importance of setting forth, by way of pre-trial motions and during trial, any potential issue on appeal.  Second, properly set forth, on the record, the basis for your argument, stating with specificity, the factual grounds for your argument.  A failure to do either of these severally handicaps the defendant’s appellate arguements.

The first of many court decisions relating to the admissibility of breath tests taken from the Intoxilizer 8000 has come down.  Judge Gary Dumm of the Circleville Municipal Court has deemed results form the Intoxilizer 8000 to be inadmissible without presenting scientific proof of the machine’s reliability.

 
Seven Hundred of the controversial breathalyzers were purchased by the Ohio Department of Health with a federal grant and almost immediately drew criticism from the defense bar because the machine has been rejected by many states due to the manufacturer’s refusal to subject the machine’s internal software to review.

 
Of course, the accuracy of the machine is being debated throughout the state with pros and cons falling on whichever side of the legal coin they fall.  Prosecutors and the Department of Health say the machine works perfectly and defense attorneys and due process advocates claim the machine gives fall positives due to heat and humidity and identify other substances as alcohol.  As a result, the machine is not being used in urban counties but are prevalent in many rural counties.  Urban counties rightfully have begged off the use of the machine until a definitive decision has benn made regarding the admissibility of the breathalyzer’s results.  Because there are so many more DUI/OVI cases in these counties, the cities have decided, at present, to avoid clogging their courts with motions to suppress.

 
The machine’s major benefit is its portability.  Officers in the field can carry the machine with them and test drivers without the time consuming task of taking the driver into custody and transporting them to the local police station where the driver can be tested on a stationary machine.

 
It is important to note that the case denying the admissibility of breath evidence only applies to cases within the jurisdiction of The Circleville Municipal Court.  But, I suspect many more of these types of cases will be filed in other courts where the machine is being used and appeals will be filed and, finally, The Ohio Supreme Court will make the final decision regarding the use of the Intoxilizer 8000′s findings.  Stay tuned!

My OVI/DUI practice has taken me to numerous courts throughout Ohio and I have observed a growing trend that, while perfectly within the discretion of the court, is being used by certain courts to curtail the use of pre-trial motions in defense of OVI/DUI charges.

 
This trend involves the strict adherence to Criminal Rule 16(D).  The Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure provide prescribed guidelines for the administration of criminal cases in Ohio. All Ohio courts follow these rules during the prosecution of an OVI/DUI case.  While the rules do set forth specific requirements, interspersed with these rules is verbiage that does permit courts discretion in the application of those rules permiting expansion and contractions “in the interests of justice.”

 
But, more and more courts are using the rules to cut off a defendant’s due process rights by unfairly requiring strict compliance, rather than the flexibility built into the rules.  An example of the trend is the use of strict compliance with Criminal Rule 16(D).  The rule reads: “All pretrial motions…shall be made within thirty-five days after arraignment or seven days before trial, whichever is earlier.”  But, built into the rules is the flexibility to expand that time frame.  The rules goes on to say: “The court in the interest of justice may extend the time for making pretrial motions.”

 
From a practical standpoint it is nearly impossible to comply with this rule.  The due diligence required in defending an OVI/DUI case almost always requires more than 35 days to complete.  This is especially true when the prosecution fails to provide all the discovery requested and the defendant must continually contact the prosecutor to obtain this evidence or, worse, must address the issue by way of a motion to the court.

 
For example, the first pre-trial is normally set two to three weeks after the initial appearance.  In most instances this is the first time defense counsel will have an opportunity to review the police report and other pertinent information provided by the prosecution.  Invariably, field and booking tapes are not provided nor is information regarding compliance with chemical test procedures.  In addition, a reading of the information provided at this pre-trial may point to other evidence that the defense may want to investigate.  After the first pre-trial, due diligence requires a view of the field and booking videos (when received) and a visit to the police department or testing laboratory to review compliance with required procedures. In most instances, all these actions, plus the mandated research regarding any anomalies found, brings one well past the 35 day requirement.

 
Generally, most courts are extremely flexible in regard to the enforcement of Criminal Rule 16(D).  In fact, most courts routinely allow the filing of pre-trial motions past the required date without the necessity of filing a motion to do so.  But an alarming number of municipal courts are now using this rule to curtail valid pre-trial motions by demanding that all motions to be filed within the time frame set forth in the rule and will not permit any filings after that date even though there are valid reasons for the late filing.

 

So what does one do to protect one’s constitutional rights?

 
First, be sure you file a motion to extend the time for filing pre-trial motions and set forth the reasons for doing so.  Follow up to make sure the court rules on the motion and sets forth, with specificity, the time by which you must file your pre-trial motions.  Make sure your motion is spread on the docket as well as the court’s ruling.

 
Second, if the prosecutor has not provided all the discovery requested, file a Motion to Compel Discovery setting forth what you requested in your original discovery request and what was provided. Once again, make sure your motion is docketed as well as the court’s ruling.

 

Third, be cognizant of the time and mark your personal docket or calendar with “drop dead” date by which you must file your motions.
Finally, always “protect the record.”  If, for example, you are unable to file your motions even after the extension given by the court, file an appropriate pleading with the court setting forth, in detail, why.  Ask for an additional extension or other relief.

 
Invariably, courts who use this tactic probably will rule unfavorably on any pre-trial motion you will file.  So, as I said above, be sure all your motions are written with specificity, are docketed and that the court’s rulings on your motions are also on the court’s docket.  If the court has not ruled on your motion, take steps to mandate the court do so in order to have a complete record to forward to the court of appeals.

If you have followed this blog you are aware of Ohio’s enhanced sentencing for multiple offenses of OVI.  O.R.C. 4511.19 is a convoluted statute that outlines the various types of OVI that can be charged but also sets forth sentencing parameters at each level of offense.  The sentencing provisions of the law speak to the number of OVI offenses in six years or 20 years if certain factors are present.  In either instance, the offense is listed as a misdemeanor for multiple offenses of 3 or less and felonies if four or more.
The designations are significant not only from a sentencing point but are determinative of Ohio speedy trial statute.   According to O.R.C. 2945.71, a defendant must be brought to trial as follows:
(1) Within forty-five days after the person’s arrest or the service of summons, if the offense charged is a misdemeanor of the third or fourth degree, or other misdemeanor for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for not more than sixty days;
(2) Within ninety days after the person’s arrest or the service of summons, if the offense charged is a misdemeanor of the first or second degree, or other misdemeanor for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for more than sixty days.
(3) Within two hundred seventy days after the person’s arrest for any felony.
Most municipal ordinances and the Ohio Revised Code codify a misdemeanor OVI as a first degree misdemeanor requiring trial within 90 days of arrest.  An OVI arrest designated as a felony (four or more) requires trial within 270 days of arrest.  If a defendant is not tried within these time parameters, the case must be dismissed.
But like all statutes, the times set forth in O.R.C. 2945.71 are not carved in stone.  The time will temporarily stop for a number of reasons.  In legal parlance, this is called “tolling.”  Tolling will occur for many reasons including:
1.  A time waiver by the defendant.  Normally, this “time waiver” is signed by the defendant at their initial appearance.  If the accused wishes to have their case heard expeditiously, they should not sign the waiver.  But, from a professional viewpoint, if a case is being properly reviewed by competent counsel, it will take longer than 90 days to properly review all evidence in the case.  And, from a practical point of view, the time will be tolled anyway.  (See below)
2.  Any motions filed on behalf of the defendant, including requests for discovery.  When a defendant files a motion, such a request for discovery or motion for limited driving privileges, speedy trial time is tolled for a reasonable amount of time (usually 30 days).
3.  Any time the court docket is full and the trial is delayed due to “the business of the court.”  This usually occurs when the accused trial is continued due to the court already being in trial on another matter.  Again this time delay must be reasonable.
But, taken in total, an appellate court will not permit an accused to be waiting interminably for their trial.  Competent counsel will properly research the applicable law and prepare the proper calculations to make sure his client’s constitutional right to a speedy trial is not impaired.
The appellate court will not tolerate interminable delays by the city in responding to defendant’s request for discovery or response to a defense motion.  As I said above, while the time is tolled, it will be tolled for only a reasonable time to afford the prosecutor time to respond and the court to resolve the controversy.  Anything more than that will result in the time clock starting once again.
A recent Third Appellate District Court case further evidences Ohio courts’ continuing efforts to expand the right of police officers to stop a vehicle although the reasons for the stop may stretch the exceptions against an illegal search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The case, State v. Jenkins, 2010 Ohio 5943, involved the stop of a driver by a Marysville, Ohio police officer after the officer found that the driver’s license of the driver was under suspension by way of a license check.  The defendant was driving on a Sunday at 6:18 pm.  The officer testified that the vehicle was traveling at a speed of 10 mph over the seed limit.  The defendant was not cited for speed but in checking the license plate through the LEADS database it was discovered that the owner had limited driving privileges.  The driver of the vehicle matched the general description of the owner.  The officer stopped the vehicle and discovered that the defendant was, in fact, the owner and his license was suspended,  save the limited privileges given to him.
Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion to suppress citing his fourth amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.  The defendant claimed the officer had insufficient articuable facts that would warrant his top as the defendant was not cited for any underlying criminal or traffic violation.
The court, in its opinion, stated, …for a law enforcement officer to conduct a warrantless search, he must possess probable cause, which means that “‘there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” State v. Carlson (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 585, 600, 657 N.E.2d 591, quoting Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213, 214, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527. However, even where probable cause is lacking, it is well-established that a law enforcement officer may temporarily detain an individual where he has a reasonable articulable suspicion that the individual is engaging in criminal activity. State v. Bobo (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 179, 524 N.E.2d 489, citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.”
The court went on, “Reasonable articulable suspicion is “‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.’” Stephenson, 2004 Ohio 5102, at P16, quoting Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d at 178. In forming reasonable articulable suspicion, law enforcement officers may “draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’” United States v. Arvizu (2002), 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S. Ct. 744, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740, quoting United States v. Cortez (1981), 449 U.S. 411, 417-418, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621. Further, an officer who witnesses a traffic violation possesses probable cause, and a reasonable articulable suspicion, to conduct a traffic stop. Id. Stephenson, 2004 Ohio 5102, at P17.”
The court cited the case of State v. Mack, 9th Dist. No. 24328, 2009 Ohio 1056 in its attempt to hone in on the specific factual jurisprudence.  That case cited two elements justifying that stop: that the drivers’ suspended license combined with the fact that the stop took place at 2:00 a.m. demonstrated the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion for an investigatory stop of the vehicle.  In summary, “[a] police officer has a constitutionally legitimate basis to stop a vehicle when: 1) the officer learns that the registered owner of the vehicle has a suspended license with limited driving privileges; and 2) both the late hour when the driver is operating the vehicle and the location from which the vehicle is driven provide a reasonable inference that the driver may not be operating the vehicle within the scope of his limited driving privileges,” State v. Elliott, 4th Dist. No. 08CA50, 2009 Ohio 6006.
In justifying the lower court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress, the appellate court came to the following conclusions in its resolution of the time differential (2:00 am v. 6:18 pm):
“…we find applicable the more general findings of Elliott concerning the relevancy of the hour during which the driver is operating his vehicle, and the location from which the vehicle is driven. Here, Officer Bartholomew testified that he observed Jenkins operating his vehicle at 6:18 p.m. on a Sunday evening; that he learned through dispatch that Jenkins’ license was suspended, but that he had limited driving privileges; that Jenkins had a passenger in his vehicle; and, that Jenkins was traveling away from his address. We find that, from the totality of these circumstances, Officer Bartholomew had a reasonable articulable suspicion that Jenkins may not have been driving within his limited privileges and was permitted to stop the vehicle to investigate further.”
This writer is having a difficult time understanding the court’s reasoning.  First the court cites the acute differences between the present case and the Elliot and Mack cases and then summarily agrees with the officer’s right to stop the defendant even though the facts are starkly different.

A recent Third Appellate District Court case further evidences Ohio courts’ continuing efforts to expand the right of police officers to stop a vehicle although the reasons for the stop may stretch the exceptions against an illegal search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.