Many of my readers contact me, post-conviction, to complain about their attorney’s performance while representing them. Of course, this outrage comes from the fact that the outcome was not of their liking – mostly convictions. A number asked whether the fact they had a “bad” lawyer can be used to appeal their conviction.
In past blogs, I’ve discussed what, in my opinion, is the appropriate due diligence required of any attorney practicing DUI defense in Ohio (See “What Should You Expect from Your Attorney?, June 19, 2009). But, if one appeals based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, what burden must be overcome to be successful?
The decision cited by most courts relating to this issue is Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. The decision was adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St. 3d 136 and, most recently used in the Ohio Second Appellate District in State v. Sparks, 2011 Ohio 3868. In that case, the Appellant argued ineffective assistance of counsel based upon the attorney’s stipulation to prior DUI convictions.
The court properly quoted the two-pronged test, using the Stickland court, as follows: “To reverse a conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel, it must be demonstrated that trial counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that his errors were serious enough to create a reasonable probability that, but for the errors, the result of the trial would have been different…Hindsight is not permitted to distort the assessment of what was reasonable in light of counsel’s perspective at the time, and a debatable decision concerning trial strategy cannot form the basis of a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel,” State v. Mitchell, Montgomery App. No. 21957, 2008 Ohio 493.
Using the criteria, the court reasoned, “By stipulating to a prior conviction, the prosecutor was relieved of his obligation to prove a prior, but this was not the focus of the defense and was not controverted. The stipulation may well have been a matter of trial strategy. We cannot conclude that defense counsel’s stipulation to one of Spark’s previous convictions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, or that the outcome of the trial would have been otherwise had defense counsel not so stipulated. There is no showing on this record that the prosecutor was unable to establish a prior conviction absent the stipulation.”
In other words, the court found there was ample evidence of Spark’s prior convictions. Therefore, even had his attorney NOT stipulated to the prior convictions, there was sufficient evidence before the court regarding his prior convictions and, as such, the attorney’s failure, if any, was not so erroneous as to cause a different outcome.
So, if one wishes to argue his attorney was ineffective, they must show:
1. That the attorney’s actions fell below the standard that is reasonable, AND
2. That, the actions of the attorney were so serious as to create a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.
So, the basis of an appeal for ineffective assistance counsel can not be based upon a reflection of an attorney’s strategy during trial as the higher court will not use hindsight to determine the appropriateness of the attorney’s strategy. While strategy might not have been successful, if reasonable, the court will not remand based upon that fact.