Archive for September, 2009
Many of my readers (in spite of my pleas to the contrary) enter court and attempt to resolve their OVI cases without benefit of counsel. The usual scenario consists of the first time offender pleading to one of the OVI charges, paying a fine, suffering a lengthy license suspension, and attending a 3-day diversion program.
But, because any OVI has a possible jail sentence of 6-months or more, the law mandates that any defendant be given their rights prior to the court accepting a plea. Criminal Rule 11(E) provides that “the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no contest, and shall not accept such pleas without first informing the defendant of the effect of the plea of guilty, no contest, and not guilty.”
The provisions of Crim. R. 44(B) and (C) regarding counsel apply to division (E) of this rule. Crim. R. 44(B) governs the appointment of counsel in petty offenses: “Where a defendant charged with a petty offense is unable to obtain counsel, the court may assign counsel to represent him. When a defendant charged with a petty offense is unable to obtain counsel, no sentence of confinement may be imposed upon him, unless after being fully advised by the court, he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives assignment of counsel.” The rule goes on to say that the waiver must also be in writing and filed with the court.
A knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of counsel is demonstrated through inquiry by the trial court that is sufficient “to determine whether defendant fully understands and intelligently relinquishes” representation. State v. Gibson, 45 Ohio St.2d 366, 345 N.E.2d 399.
Therefore, any defendant charged with an offense wherein a 6-month sentence, or more, can be imposed must be apprised of his constitutional rights, if not represented by counsel, including their right to an attorney, their right to confront witnesses against them, their right to subpoena witnesses on their behalf, the right to be tried by a jury or by the court, and their right to remain silent and requiring the state to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
These rights must be outlined in open court on the record. His waiver of these rights must also be in writing and kept on file with the court. In fact, if the court fails to comply with the edicts of Criminal Rule 11(E) and 44(B) and (C), no plea to a subsequent OVI can be enhanced.
So, if you insist on representing yourself in court, be sure you are made aware of your constitutional rights, understand them, have them given to you in open court, in writing, and filed with the court.
Anyone reading this blog is acquainted with the three scientifically accepted field sobriety tests by NHSTA – Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus, walk and turn and one legged stand tests. As previously discussed, Ohio Revised Code O.R.C. 4511.19(D)(4)(b) requires officers to substantially comply with the standards required of NHTSA (or other recognized protocol) before they can be used a basis for arresting a person for OVI.
But, assuming these standards are not used and the court suppresses the results of these tests can the officers observations be used in the prosecution for OVI. Based upon Ohio jurisprudence, the answer is yes.
A recent Eighth Appellate District case demonstrates this issue. In the case, Village of Brooklyn, Heights v. Yee, 2009 Ohio 4552, the driver was stopped after the officer observed her cross the center line three times. After the stop, the officer conducted three tests – the finger to nose test, the alphabet test, and the finger count test. The driver refused to submit to a walk and turn test or a one legged stand test claiming she was injured in a motorcycle test. Based upon the officer’s observations, Yee was arrested and charged with operating a vehicle under the influence.
In a pre-trial motion, the Yee argued that Ohio only recognizes three standardized field sobriety tests, namely: the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test (HGN), the One-Leg Stand, and the Walk and Turn. Thus, the tests administered by the officer were inadmissible. (It is important to note that the opinion is not clear whether the defendant was asking to suppress the results only or the observations of the officer. But, we can only assume the defendant was seeking to suppress the results AND the officer’s observations)
Nonetheless, the court held that an officer’s observations regarding a defendant’s performance on nonscientific field sobriety tests is admissible as lay evidence of intoxication. The court quoted State v. Schmitt, 101 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004 Ohio 37, 801 N.E.2d 446 in stating, “[t]he manner in which a defendant performs these tests may easily reveal to the average lay person whether the individual is intoxicated…[w]e see no reason to treat an officer’s testimony regarding the defendant’s performance on a nonscientific field sobriety test any differently from his testimony addressing other indicia of intoxication, such as slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and odor of alcohol.”
Therefore, while the court fails to make clear whether the results were admissible, it is obvious an officer can testify as to his observations. Of course, a well trained attorney fully versed on NHTSA standards and the reasoning behind NHTSA’s rejection of the FST’s as used by the officer in the Yee case will properly cross-examine the officer regarding these disparities.